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Abstract: By art. 1 para. (4), Romanian Constitution, republished, enshrined the 
principle of separation and balance of powers. Therefore, this principle implies the existence 
of collaboration but also of a mutual control between these powers, including between the 
legislative and executive power, thus being expressed the balance between these two powers. 
By constitutional established powers, the two central authorities of the executive power - the 
President of Romania and the Government - will participate at the observance and 
application of this principle, including by those duties they perform in their relations with the 
legislative power. 
Keywords: head of state, legislative power, convening, dissolution, messages, 
promulgation 
 
Introduction 
Based on the constitutional provisions in force, we can identify two functions of the 
Romanian executive, namely the executive one and the administrative one. In our view, the 
determination of the powers which enable fulfilling these functions it is possible by reporting 
to the executive structures and, therefore, the specific functions of each of them. Motivation 
of this allegation is that the powers enshrined in the constitution and laws in the task of these 
structures, in fact represents their competence, namely of the head of state - the president or 
monarch, and of the government. So we appreciate as difficult, if not impossible, to talk about 
the competence of the executive as stand-alone entity, more so as most contemporary 
constitutional systems have established a dualist executive and not a monocratic one. 
Convening of Parliament1 
According to Article 63 para (3) of our Constitution, republished, the newly elected 
Parliament convened by the President of Romania, within 20 days from the election2, but also 
in his request, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate can also meet in special sessions. 
                                                 
1 See O. Şaramet, "Powers of the Romanian President in relations with Parliament. Convening and dissolution of 
Parliament" in I. Boldea, coordinator, Debates on globalization. approaching national identity through 
intercultural dialogue. Studies and article. Section: Social studies, "Arhipelag Press XXI", Târgu-Mureş, 2015, 
pag. 721-729. 
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And so, for the first session after the elections, the constituent legislator has the 
obligation of the President of Romania, to convene the new parliament, thus making a 
prerogative – reminiscent of the period in which the monarch was trying to reserve some 
procedural paths meant to assure a further influence on the new legislative3, prerogative that 
was taken by the constitutions of states that have established a parliamentary regime or a 
semi-presidential one. Starting from the premise that at the time they would meet in their first 
session after the elections, neither the Chambers of Deputies nor the Senate have designated 
internal teams of work, so not even their presidents who could take over the attribution from 
the President of Romania, appreciated by our lawgiver as the latter – authority placed at “the 
highest level of the hierarchy of executive power”4, with permanent activity, not knowing a 
“presidential vacation” similar to the parliamentary one, to be the one to convene the newly 
elected parliament in its first session. However, taking into account the examples offered by 
the provisions of constitutions5, and also the provisions and dispositions of our Constitution 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Provisions similar to those in our Constitution we can find in Constitution of Poland, art.109 para.(2), settled 
the right of the President of Republic to convene the newly elected House of Representatives – Sejm – and 
Senate, within 30 days from the date of the elections, in their first session. This Constitution was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_2009.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. 
3 See T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. II, „Lumina Lex” Publishing 
House, Bucharest, 2000, pag.240. This power of the head of state is found today in the constitutions of countries 
with constitutional monarchies. Thus, for example, art.35 para.(1) of the Constitution of Denmark, adopted on 
June 5, 1953, provides that A newly elected Folketing shall assemble at twelve o'clock noon on the twelfth 
week-day after the day of election, unless the King has previously convoked a meeting of its Members. This 
Constitution was consulted on: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953.pdf?lang=en, 
accessed: 25.10.2015. Likewise are the provisions of the Constitution of Norway, adopted on May 17, 1814, the 
King, according to art.68, can, by reason of extraordinary circumstances, such as hostile invasion or infectious 
disease, designates another town in the Realm for the purpose, to assemble on the first weekday in October every 
year in the capital of the Realm. When the Storting is not assembled, it may be summoned by the King if he 
finds it necessary, according to art. 69. This Constitution was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2015.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. More than this 
the Grand Duke of Luxembourg, according to art.72 para.(3) of Constitution of Luxembourg, adopted on 
October 17, 1868, opens and closes each ordinary session of the Chamber either in person, or in his name 
by his proxy appointed for that purpose. This Constitution was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009.pdf?lang=en, accessed:  25.10.2015. Art.62 
point b) of Constitution of Spain, entered into force on December 29, 1978, provides the same specifying that the 
King is the one who summon and dissolve the Cortes Generales and to call for elections under the terms 
provided for in the Constitution. This Constitution was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. We can observe 
that although some constitutions have provided a certain date when newly elected parliaments can meet, they 
have recognized that the monarch is still able to convene parliament in extraordinary sessions. 
4See T. Drăganu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. II, „Lumina Lex” Publishing 
House, Bucharest, 2000, pag.240. 
5 Compared to them, we can mention examples from other constitutions. Thus Article 133 c) from the 
Constitution of Portugal recognizes the President’s ability to convene in extraordinary assembly the Republic, 
only on emergencies, in the same way as the provisions in Article 63 from the Constitution of Argentina, with 
the specification that in this case it is recognized the President’s possibility to extend a regular session. 
Constitution of Portugal was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. Constitution 
of Argentina was consulted on: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994.pdf?lang=en, 
accessed: 25.10.2015. In these cases, the constituent legislator preferred to score a date or a period in which the 
new elected Parliament to convene its first session, without according this attribution to the head of state. 
Therefore in Portugal, according to Article 173 para (1), thesis I, the Republic Assembly shall meet on the third 
day subsequent to the day in which the final results of the election were communicated.  
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form 1866 and 19236, we appreciate that this attribution of the President can be replaced with 
the institutional obligation imposed by constitutional provisions that the newly elected 
parliament to convene at a certain time or after a certain amount of time from the established 
and communicated final result of the elections. An additional argument against this proposal 
of enactment of the law is, in principle, the fact that in the case where the President of 
Romania does not convene the newly elected Parliament within 20 days from the elections, 
there will be a meeting. 
Like most constitutions7, our Constitution recognizes the right of the Head of State to 
convene the Parliament in an extraordinary session, in certain prescribed conditions, with or 
without prior consultation of other authorities, as is the Government or internal teams of work 
of the Parliament or political parties represented by the Legislative. Thus, although the 
provisions of Article 66 para (3) of our Constitution does specify only that the President of 
Romania or the permanent office of each Chamber or at least a third of the senators and 
deputies can demand convening of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate in an extraordinary 
session, the Regulations of the two Chambers specify the conditions that must be met when 
such a request is to be taken into consideration. Both Article 81 para (2) and (4) of the 
Regulations of the Senate8, and Article 84 para (3) from the Regulation of the Chamber of 
Deputies9 stated that any request of convening any extraordinary session, regardless of which 
of those entitled formulated it, shall be done in writing and need to contain the following: the 
reason, the proposed agenda, and also the duration of the session. Lack of any of these 
elements and the rejection of the proposed agenda, by the Chamber, will not allow the 
extraordinary session to take place.  But, while the demand for convening is formulated, for 
                                                 
6 In this respect, see the provisions of Article 95, para (1), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) from our Constitution from 
1866, namely Article 90 para (1), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) from the Constitution of 1923. The constitutional rules 
recognize the right of the King to convene the Assemblies in extraordinary sessions, and to dissolve both 
Chambers and just one of them, to present a message at the beginning of a session, to close the works of the 
Assembly. It is recognized the right to convene the Parliament – National Representation, only just before the 
time when the two Assemblies should meet to make the law, namely 15th of October of each year. 
7For example, the provisions of Article 84 para (2) from the Constitution of Slovenia, they recognize the 
Republic President’s right to request the convening of a special session of the National Assembly – the 
Slovenian Parliament. Constitution of Slovenia was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2013.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. In exchange, 
the constituent French legislator recognizes the Prime Minister’s, and not the President’s, right to ask that the 
Parliament meet in an extraordinary session, according to Article 29 para (1) from the Constitution, but, if the 
Parliament does not meet in right, the opening and closing of the extraordinary sessions will be discreetly made 
by the President of the Republic. Constitution of France was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. Appreciated by 
the French doctrine as being an attribution, a competence tied to the French President against which his 
discretionary power could not manifest, not even in a period of cohabitation, practice has imposed modifying 
this point of view. Thus, presidents like Du Galle or Mitterrand have refused to sign such decree which also had 
justified the doctrine to assert that the final decision to convene or not in an extraordinary session which, in fact, 
is the decision of the French President. The amendment of the Constitution in the year 1995 and introducing a 
unique session of the Parliament has been appreciated in the doctrine as being one of the ways to quit the 
convening of the Parliament in an extraordinary session, and, implicitly, the possibility of the Republic’s 
President to manifest the discretion, and to avoid possible political conflicts, especially the ones between him 
and Prime Minister, him and the Parliament. In this regard, see H. Portelli, Droit constitutionnel, Dalloz 
Publishing House, Paris, 1999, pag.204, and also pag.251. 
8 See: https://www.senat.ro/pagini/reg_sen/reg_senat.htm; accessed: 25.10.2015. 
9 See: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=regcd1_1; accessed: 25.10.2015. 
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example, by the President of Romania, the actual convene, even in an extraordinary session, is 
a prerogative of the Presidents of the Chambers such as is apparent from both the 
constitutional rule – Article 66 para (3), and the provisions of the two mentioned regulations – 
Article 81 para (3) and Article 84 para (4). These texts of the regulations specify the fact that 
in the case where a request for convening in an extraordinary session does not include the 
mandatory indications specified above, the Chairman in question has the possibility of not 
taking it into consideration. 
Dissolution of Parliament10 
The President of Romania does not have the right to give “the start” of a new 
Parliament in a new legislature or to convene it in an extraordinary session, but to end a 
legislature before the end of the 4 year mandate, the Constitution11 recognizing his right to 
dissolve the Parliament. According to Article 89 from our Constitution, the President of 
Romania can dissolve the Parliament and not just one of its Chambers, but only if the 
conditions specified herein are met: the Parliament does not allow the confidence vote for 
forming the government within 60 days from the first request; rejection in this period of at 
least two requests; the consultation of the President with both Chambers and the leaders of the 
parliamentary groups; it should be the first and only dissolution in a year; it should not be 
about the last 6 month of the President’s mandate and it should not be instituted one of the 
following states: mobilization, war, siege or emergency. 
Expression of a political crisis, this “weapon” of dissolution is a direct and personal 
action of the President against the Parliament, not just a nomination of his competence thereof 
involves just putting his signature on a decree whose application lies, in fact, to the Prime 
Minister12. In taking this decision the President is only conditioned to consult with the 
presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament and with the leaders of the groups of 
parliament, but it is not obliged to take account of their views, the final decision belonging 
entirely to him. By taking this decision, the President can avoid some institutional or social 
blockage, particularly, in our opinion, at the time when the Government needs to cohabit with 
                                                 
10 See O. Şaramet, "Powers of the Romanian President in relations with Parliament. Convening and dissolution 
of Parliament" in I. Boldea, coordinator, Debates on globalization. approaching national identity through 
intercultural dialogue. Studies and article. Section: Social studies, "Arhipelag Press XXI", Târgu-Mureş, 2015, 
pag. 721-729. 
11 Most constitutions recognize to the head of state – president or monarch – this right. For example, Article 88 
para (1) from the Constitution of Italy provides the possibility that the Republican President to dissolve both or 
just one of them, after consulting the presidents of the two Houses of Parliament. In exchange, the constituent 
legislator from Czech Republic has recognized that the Republic’s President, according to Article 62 c) just the 
right to dissolve one of the Chambers of the Parliament, respectively the Chamber of Deputies. Constitution of 
Italy was consulted on: https https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Italy_2012.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 
25.10.2015. Constitution of Czech Republic was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. 
Moreover, the Latvian Constitution, through article 48, gave the President of the Republic just the right to 
propose the dissolution of the Parliament, based on his proposal will be held a referendum, and if more than half 
of the votes cast are “for” dissolving, the Parliament will be considered as dissolved. But if, in the case where 
after the referendum, the Parliament is not dissolved, the responsibility belongs to the President that considers it 
dismissed, the Parliament choosing another President to fulfill the mandate. Constitution of Latvia was consulted 
on: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Latvia_2014.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015. 
12 See P. Pactet, Institutions politiques. Droit constitutionnel, Masson Publishing House, Paris, 1993, pag.390-
392. 
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the Parliament, the majority of the Parliament is not in favor of the government that becomes 
minority, provided that the President should be “on the side” of the Government. But the 
dissolution is seen as a “weapon of government coalition attacks”13 when the President is not 
supported in his actions by the majority of the Parliament, thus the Government becomes its 
exponent.  
These meanings identified by the French doctrine gives the French President an active 
role in the relation between the executive and the legislative, stating that in this system, the 
President, according to Article 12 from the Constitution, can dissolve just one of the 
Chambers of Parliament, namely the National Assembly. However, we are not taking into 
consideration that such role, “fits” on the profile of the President of Romania close to a 
president of parliamentary republic, than the one from a semi-presidential republic, such as 
the French one. Nevertheless, we appreciate that exercising this attribution by the President of 
Romania would be more justifiable in situations where we can talk about an institutional 
blockage, unless it is cause and effect at the same time, while being just political games. 
Anyway, if he decides to dissolve the Parliament, the President must fully comply with the 
conditions established by constitution and classified by doctrine14 in general terms, namely: 
the denial of the Parliament’s vote of confidence to form the Government within 60 days from 
the first request; the rejection of at least two requests; the prior consultation of the Presidents 
of the two Chambers and of the leaders of the parliamentary groups, and special conditions, as 
well as the rest of them that have been listed above. 
Addressing Parliament messages 
Another attribution of the President, in his relations to the Parliament, is the possibility 
or obligation of addressing messages. In this regard, Article 88 from the Constitution provides 
him the possibility to address messages regarding the main political issues of the nation, thus 
creating the possibility for the President to communicate with the Parliament, knowing that 
there is no subordinating relations between these two authorities, but also the fact that the 
President does not politically respond in front of the Parliament, like the Government. 
Assessment of the moment, content, form, even the way of addressing or not of the message, 
belongs only to the President. But the effects that such a message can produce, can not only 
be political or juridical, the President being unable to impose his own points of view, so as nor 
the Parliament can force to express its opinion regarding certain problems. 
However, the President has the obligation to address a message to the Parliament 
when there is a case of armed aggression against the country, being forced to take urgent 
actions to dismiss it, actions that must be immediately communicated to the Parliament. In 
this case, unlike the former one, the Parliament can debate this message at the same time with 
the moment of its presentation15. 
Promulgations of laws 
                                                 
13 Idem, pag.392 
14 A. Iorgovan, Tratat de drept administrativ, vol.I, „All Beck” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, pag.305. 
15 In this respect see the Decision of the Constitutional Court no 87/1994 on the constitutionality Article 7 from 
the Rules of the common sessions of the Chambers of Deputies and the Senate, published in Official Gazette of 
Romania, Part I, no 292, from October 14th 1994. 
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The Executive does not limit itself only just to summon, dissolve the Parliament or 
address it a message through the President, getting involved in the lawmaking process. Thus 
the legislative initiative and the Government, together with the members of the Parliament, 
senators or a number of at least 100.000 citizens entitled to vote. In fact, most of these 
initiatives come from this authority, the legislation projects being submitted to the qualified 
Chamber to adopt it, according to Article 74, para (3) from the Constitution, as a first notified 
Chamber, according to Article 75 from the same legislative document. Entrusting the right of 
legislative initiative of the Government is, in fact, justified by the constitutional role, in the 
achievement of which, the Government 16 it would be best qualified, knowing its realities and 
the existent needs in the society, knowing the legal requirements of the state, but also 
knowing how to promote these towards the Legislature. Both realities and needs of the society 
will be reflected in the explanatory memoranda that mandatory accompany the legislative 
projects, according to Article 29 para (1) from the Law 24/2000 on legislative techniques for 
drafting laws, republished with the subsequent amendments. In consideration of the 
constitutional provisions, Law 90/2001, with the subsequent amendments, has recognized by 
Article 11 b), as one of the main tasks of the Government and the initiation of bills and their 
subjection to the Parliament, but also the one according that the Government prepares the 
drafts of law on the state budget and of the budget of social insurance (Article 11 e) ), as well 
as the enforcement of powers of the authorities and public administration laws and other 
legislative provisions adopted in application thereof (Article 11 d)  ). 
Although our Constitution has not recognized the President as having the right of 
initiative legislature17, we should mention an exception established by Article 150 para (1) 
from the Constitution, republished, that states that the two authorities need to collaborate in 
this regard, conditioned by a proposal made by the Government, and thus the President of 
Romania can initiate a proposal to revise the Constitution. 
If the “birth” of a law is due to mostly the implication of the Government, its 
publication in the Official Gazette of Romania and its entry into force is conditioned by 
promulgation18 by the President. By signing the bill, the President authenticates the text of 
                                                 
16 The subordinating and the collaborating reports that the Government has with the ministries and other 
specialized bodies on the public central local administration that are subordinated to or in the subordination of or 
in coordination of ministries with prefectures and the bodies of public local administration, and also with the 
autonomous administrative authorities, allow the Government to exercise the legislative initiative including 
acquiring bills drafted by those authorities. To achieve a good development of the law drafting, the submission 
for approval, starting with February 1st 2008, entered a new regulation on procedures, at the level of the 
Government to elaborate, check and present the projects of documents on public politics, of projects on 
normative acts, and other documents, for adoption/approval, regulations approved by Government Decision 
1226/2007 published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no 716 from October 23rd 2007. 
17 In contrast, the Latvian constituent legislator recognized, through Article 47, the right to legislative initiative 
of the President of the Republic. 
18 It is one of the recognized attributions by the majority of the modern constitutions. Such provisions are found, 
for examples, in Article 78 para (6) in conjunction with Article 107 from the Constitution of Estonia; section 99 
point 3) from the Constitution of Argentina; Article 91 from the Constitution of Slovenia; article 136  b) from the 
Constitution of Portugal. One of the constitutions, such as the one of Czech Republic, by Article 62 h) and i), 
recognize the right of the President to sign laws, and some of the fundamental laws of the constitutional 
monarchies, although entitle the head of state – monarch to sign the laws and force the ministers or secretaries of 
state to countersign, as applicable in the case of the Dutch Constitution which enshrined this duty to ministers or 
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law19, finding and certifying, practically, the regularity of adoption20. The promulgation is not 
a discretionary measure of the President because, even if it has the possibility of resubmitting 
it to the Parliament for a review or to the constitutional court to monitor compliance with the 
Constitution, in no case has the right to refuse promulgation. 
By this, the prerogative of the President is to promulgate a law distinguishing it by the 
prerogative taken up, at a time of monarchs, including our monarch21, to sanction laws. 
Basically, the head of the state manifests a reminiscent of absolute monarchy, where the law 
is a manifestation of royal will22, through which he would become a co-legislator23 because 
confirming, approving the law, it participates in the legislative work, not manifesting a 
passive attitude of acceptance, in certain circumstances, of the adopted law by the Parliament. 
Our actual constitutional provision, namely Article 77, obliges the President to 
promulgate the law within 20 days after receiving it24, but it gives the possibility to seek the 
Parliament only once, reconsidering the law, or to ask the Constitutional Court of Romania to 
verify the constitutionality of the law. After receiving the adopted law, after reexamination, 
after receiving the decision of the Constitutional Court confirming its constitutionality, the 
President is obliged to promulgate the law within 10 days. 
As we consider, we appreciate that the President could refer, at the same time, the 
same law both to the Parliament for reexamination, and the Constitutional Court on the fact 
that the notifications of the motives are not identical. Thus, the Parliament could be seized 
only for reasons of parliamentary procedure for adoption of the law, the technical- legal 
reasons, when the Constitutional Law can be seized for possible inconsistencies in terms of 
the context between the rules of law and the ones of the Constitution’s, in other terms for 
                                                                                                                                                        
state secretaries in Article 47. Constitution of Netherland was consulted on: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Netherlands_2008.pdf?lang=en, accessed: 25.10.2015    
19 In the doctrine it was appreciated the fact that the promulgating procedure is not a simple “executory force” 
always necessary for the law to be adopted, appearing more like a term brought in conditions of Article 146 a) 
from the Constitution, Constitutional Court or it can be brought in Article 77 para (2) from the same law, 
Parliament.  It was also pointed out the fact that in the case where the President does not promulgate the law 
within the time and under the conditions specified in Article 77, it can appear in the Official Gazette even 
without being accompanied by the promulgating Act – the Presidential Decree. See in this regard T. Drăganu, 
Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice. Tratat elementar, vol. II, „Lumina Lex” Publishing House, Bucharest, 
2000, pag.249. 
20 I. Muraru, S.E. Tănăsescu, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, C.H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest 
2006, vol.II, pag.216. 
21 Article 93 para. (1) and (2) of the Romanian Constitution ofb1866 recognizes the right of our King to sanction 
and promulgate laws, or to refuse their sanctioning, similar provisions being found in Article 88 para. (1) and (2) 
of our Constitution of 1923.  
22 P. Negulescu, Curs de drept constituţional român, published by Alex. Th. Doicescu, Bucharest, 1928, 
pag.395. 
23 Idem, pag.394 
24 A rather large term, in our opinion, compared with other provisions of other Constitutions. For example, the 
Constitution of Estonia, Article 107 para (2) forces the President to promulgate the law within 14 days of receipt, 
Article 10 para (1) from the French Constitution offers him a period of 15 days to exercise his power, by Article 
91 para (1) from the Constitution of Slovenia, the President is forced to promulgate in just 8 days. Therefore, we 
believe that this law, this period should be reduced to at least 10 days, the interest being the completion of the 
legislative procedure and the entry of the law into force as quickly as possible.  
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reasons of unconstitutionality. But, in order to promulgate the law, the President should wait 
for responses from both seized authorities in case he proceeded in this way25. 
The possibility of our President to prevent the adoption of a law without respecting the 
procedures or without being subject to the rules of Constitution is however limited, and on the 
other hand there is a possibility and an impossibility to refuse the promulgation on the motif 
of inexistence of the opportunity of adopting it in the context of economy, social and political 
life, at that time. In contrast, the President of the USA to whom point 2 from the para 7 in the 
Article 1 recognizes the right to sign, no to pass the bill, but not to approve it, has the 
possibility to submit his objections to the Chamber where it comes from and that is forced to 
reconsider, in turn, Chamber which, further will send the reconsiderations to the other 
Chamber. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives will have to approve the draft 
law given the objections stated by the President of the state with two-thirds vote from each 
Chamber. 
This complicated procedure, very often with a failure, especially if the majority of the 
American Congress in both Chamber or just in one is represented by the party to which the 
head of the state belongs, practically equals indirectly with a right to veto of the President 
towards the law project leading to its rejection by the President. In this situation it can be 
about the so called veto message26 when the action belongs to the President. But the President 
must express his intentions by signing or returning a bill within ten days, on the contrary the 
project of law will be promulgated as if he signed it. The Congress, even in this situation can 
stop the process of adopting a law by preventing the President to resubmit the project of law 
by suspending the parliamentary session, case where it can be about the veto pocket27, the 
action belongs to the members of the parliament through the Congress. Practically by this 
form of veto right, the Congress tries to cover its law project knowing that the President does 
not want to promulgate it and hoping that during the parliamentary recess to obtain its 
approval in advance. 
 
Conclusions 
When we are talking about the Romanian government, in the constitutional framework 
established in 1991 and revised in 2003, we are referring to the two central structures - the 
head of state and government, in a narrow sense of the term of executive. In this paper we 
intended to discuss about the most important powers exercised by the Romanian President in 
its relations with Parliament, and in another article will analyze the powers involving between 
Government and legislative power. However, we have seen from the powers mentioned 
above, that when the Romanian President is exercising its powers, either he collaborates with 
the Prime Minister, such as it is the case with the promulgation of laws, decree of 
promulgation must be countersigned by the latter, or consults with representatives of the 
                                                 
25 For more details, pro and con arguments to the solution mentioned see A. Iorgovan, Tratat de drept 
administrativ, vol.I, „All Beck” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, pag.306-308. 
26 J.Q. Wilson, American Government. Institutions and Policies, Harvard University and University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1986, pag.341 
27 Idem, pag.342 
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legislative power, such as it is the case in which the President may dissolve Parliament. 
Therefore, we appreciate that even as regards of these powers, the Romanian constitutional 
legislator has chosen a head of state who does not exercise only the function of representing 
the state, and the function of guarantor of national independence, unity and territorial 
integrity, but he shall act as a mediator between the powers in the state, by observing of the 
Constitution and of the proper functioning of the public authorities. 
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